The micromobility boom created legends, casualties, and a decade of hard lessons in just a few short years. On the Micromobility Podcast, Prabin Joel Jones sat down with Philip Reinckens, early employee at TIER and later CEO of SPIN, to unpack what really happened behind the scenes.

This is not nostalgia, but an operator’s view of what worked, what failed, and what still defines the sector in 2026.

The early TIER years: speed, timing, and controlled chaos

Philip joined TIER during its earliest growth phase, when scooters were not yet normal. In 2019, Germany shifted from banning e-scooters to making them street legal. That regulatory change triggered a launch race across major cities.

TIER executed aggressively. Teams were built city by city. Operations were structured fast. On launch day in Germany, scooters were deployed at 6 a.m., and riders immediately gathered asking how to rent them.

Within 24 hours, TIER became number one on the App Store. For months, people discussed scooter apps at dinner tables. Pricing, availability, battery levels. It was a cultural moment.

But the real story was not hype. It was execution.

TIER grew fast because it combined capital, operational ambition, and strong early hardware sourcing. There was also luck. In the early days, companies wired millions to relatively inexperienced hardware vendors in China and hoped the scooters would arrive functioning. Choosing the wrong partner could sink a company.

TIER chose well enough to scale.

COVID changed the trajectory

Then COVID hit.

Micromobility relies on movement. Commuting, restaurants, nightlife. When cities shut down, usage collapsed. Many operators pulled fleets and paused.

TIER made a bold decision. It brought operations in house instead of relying on external logistics partners. At the same time, Germany introduced short term work subsidies that reduced cost pressure.

While competitors hibernated, TIER stayed active and worked closely with cities. Scooters became a tool for essential workers, especially hospital staff, who needed individual transport in fresh air.

When lockdowns lifted, TIER was already fully deployed. That operational advantage impressed investors and helped secure major funding, including SoftBank.

The charging network thesis

One of the more ambitious ideas at the time was the charging network. The thesis was simple. Lower variable costs by incentivizing riders to swap batteries at partner locations such as supermarkets or gas stations. Improve unit economics and increase rider engagement.

On paper, it made sense.

In practice, it struggled.

Scooter usage is impulsive. Riders grab the closest vehicle and go directly from A to B. Asking them to detour into a store and spend five extra minutes swapping batteries added friction. The savings were not meaningful enough for most users to justify the extra effort.

The infrastructure lift was also heavy. Physical installations, partnerships, logistics.

Today, some operators are revisiting the concept in more refined forms. The idea was not wrong, but the timing and user behavior did not align.

Why investors cooled on the sector

Philip is blunt. Micromobility is not a classic venture capital business.

It is hardware heavy. It is operationally intensive. It requires ground teams to swap batteries and repair vehicles. Assets are vandalized. Cities regulate tightly. Firmware and supply chains sit overseas.

All of that creates complexity and margin pressure.

In theory, if a fleet reaches around two to 2.5 rides per scooter per day consistently across the year, the model prints money. In reality, demand fluctuates. Competition dilutes utilization. Weather impacts operations.

Add rising interest rates and the zero interest rate era ends quickly.

The result was consolidation. Many companies disappeared. The remaining players were forced to restructure aggressively.

The Nextbike acquisition

TIER’s acquisition of Nextbike raised eyebrows. It was not exactly the same business model. Bikes instead of scooters. Advertising revenue components. Different regional strengths.

The logic centered on synergies.

City relationships. Operational knowledge. Manufacturing experience. Strong presence in Eastern Europe. Advertising expertise on vehicles, which scooters had struggled to monetize.

Cultural and structural integration proved complex. Two companies with different DNA do not merge seamlessly. But over time, the consolidation improved resilience.

The SPIN chapter: expansion meets restructuring

TIER’s acquisition of SPIN was about entering the United States through acquisition rather than expensive organic expansion. SPIN, formerly owned by Ford, was the number three player in the US and strong in public policy relationships.

Then macro conditions shifted.

Interest rates rose. Growth narratives weakened. What had been framed as expansion quickly became a restructuring exercise.

When Philip became CEO of SPIN, the focus changed to survival and efficiency.

Losses were reduced dramatically. Old hardware was replaced. A new fleet management system was implemented. The company shifted from hundreds of headquarters staff to a leaner organization. Operations became the center of gravity.

Eventually, SPIN reached profitable months.

But the process was intense. Headcount cuts. Role consolidation. Frustration. Few quick wins.

Europe versus the United States

There are structural differences between markets.

In the US, pricing per minute is higher, often around 50 to 60 cents, compared to roughly 20 to 30 euro cents in many European markets. Revenue per scooter per day can be higher in the US, but utilization rates are often lower.

US demand skews toward weekend and leisure riders. Europe has stronger commuter patterns. US winters in northern cities can effectively shut down operations for months.

The models balance differently on each continent.

What actually moves the needle

After years across TIER and SPIN, Philip reduces the business to a simple truth.

Have the right vehicle, in the right condition, in the right place, at the right time. And an app that works flawlessly.

Everything else is noise.

PR campaigns. Grand strategic visions. Overly complex ecosystem ambitions. Most of it does not move the core metric.

Micromobility is an operations game.

It is about minimizing touches per vehicle. Reducing repair cycles. Improving firmware efficiency. Managing battery swaps. Maintaining city relationships. Controlling churn.

And delivering a frictionless experience.

When an app fails or feels clunky, riders leave. A smooth experience can matter more than a small pricing difference.

If built today

Philip often asks himself what would happen if TIER or SPIN were built in 2026 instead of 2019.

With AI tools, organizations could be leaner. General and administrative costs could be significantly lower. Decision cycles could be faster.

But even with AI, the fundamentals remain physical. Scooters still need maintenance. Batteries still need swapping. Streets still have weather and vandalism.

The core has not changed.

Micromobility may not fit the venture capital playbook that dominated the last decade. But in a world with fewer, disciplined operators focused on efficiency and execution, there is a path forward.

The gold rush is over and what remains is the real work.